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Abstract 
The Lebanese Civil War was a violent, destructive conflict that plagued Lebanon for 
fifteen years and left the country, and its capital city of Beirut in particular, completely 
devastated. The outbreak of civil war in 1975 was the product of a combination of factors, both 
internal and external, that had been developing within Lebanon since the Ottoman period and 
even earlier. The country had long been fragmented as a result of sectarianism and was further 
divided by the unique political climate that developed in the aftermath of independence in 1943. 
However, sectarianism and internal political divide, although necessary, were not sufficient to 
trigger such a violent and long-lasting conflict, evidenced by the fact that smaller clashes 
between religious and political groups had occurred in the past, but never escalated to the degree 
and intensity of the civil war in 1975. Beginning in the 1960s and 70s, the growing nationalist 
activism of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon and the increasing political and 
military power of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations deeply affected religious and 
political groups at both ends of the political spectrum, intensifying sectarian strife and political 
discord. While some groups fought to maintain the current political and social system, others, 
motivated by the actions of the Palestinian organizations, used the Palestinian military presence 
in Lebanon as a means to alter a system that did not accurately represent their interests. The 
political and military activity of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations in Lebanon was the 
catalyst that set the war in motion, escalating tensions in an already divided society. 
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Introduction 
During World War I, a series of letters were exchanged between Hussein Bin Ali, the 
Sharif of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, concerning 
the future political status of the Arabs under Ottoman rule. The British High Commissioner 
promised that if the Arabs fought alongside the British against the Ottomans, thus debilitating 
their empire, the United Kingdom would recognize Arab independence and support the creation 
of an Arab nation in the Levant and Gulf regions. Yet in the aftermath of World War I, Arabs did 
not enjoy the right to self-determination as they were promised. Instead, the Arab world was 
divided into mandates, with the French exercising power over Lebanon and Syria, and the British 
controlling Palestine, Transjordan and Egypt. Although the mandate period was relatively short, 
lasting between twenty and thirty years, this period has had serious and far-reaching 
consequences for the Arab world. The most significant result of this period was the creation of 
the state of Israel, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, and subsequently, the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom migrated to other Arab countries. In the aftermath 
of the mandate period, every Arab nation struggled with the lasting effects of colonialism and the 
right to self-determination. Yet it was the Palestinians, forced from their land and marginalized 
in their own society, who became the embodiment of the consequences of imperialism in the 
region. The nationalist activism of the Palestinian refugee population and the increasing military 
power of Palestinian guerilla organizations in the 1960s and 70s caused many other marginalized 
groups in the Arab world to address the lasting effects of colonialism in their own societies, and 
at the same time, threatened other groups whose power depended on lasting imperialist 
structures.   
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  Like many other countries in the Middle East, Lebanon has struggled with the enduring 
effects of colonization, from both the Ottoman and French mandate periods. Since the Ottoman 
period and even earlier, Lebanon has been home to a variety of religious sects and religious 
communities. Under Ottoman rule, these communities had little to no contact with one another, 
as they were relatively isolated due to the geography and politics of the region. In addition, under 
the Ottoman millet system, religious communities governed themselves, further contributing to 
the lack of interaction between sects. Although contact and conflict between these communities 
occurred occasionally, it wasn’t until the French mandate period that they were forced to interact 
with one another as part of the newly defined nation of Lebanon. It was during this period that 
certain sects gained privilege over others and deep-seated tensions developed. By the time of 
Lebanese independence in 1943, the Maronite Christians were well-established as the dominant 
religious group in Lebanon. Other sects such as the Sunni Muslims, the Druze and the Greek 
Orthodox Christians, although not nearly as powerful as the Maronites, had political power and 
status in Lebanese society as well. The Shiites, by far the most socio-economically 
disadvantaged community in Lebanon, remained politically inactive until the early 1960s, and 
had little status or power in Lebanese society. Out of this system of government and power 
developed a unique political climate in the years following independence. Lebanese society 
became politically divided, with the Maronite Christians dominating the political far right, 
interested in maintaining the current system, and the political far left, composed of a variety of 
religious groups, namely Sunnis, Druze and Greek Orthodox, interested in political and social 
change. The sectarianism and political polarization of Lebanon would be further exacerbated by 
the politicization of the Palestinian refugee population and the increasing militancy of the PLO 
and Palestinian guerilla organizations in the following decades.  
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 The unique system of sectarianism and political divide that developed in Lebanon in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was immensely influenced by the development of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the politicization of the large Palestinian refugee population 
within its borders. During their initial resettlement in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees did not 
concern themselves with Lebanese politics, focusing more on their own plight and the goal of 
returning to their homeland. Yet, as time went on and they began to realize that recovery of their 
native Palestine was not easily or quickly achievable, Palestinians in Lebanon became more 
overtly involved in nationalist activism. Beginning in the early 1960s, with the creation of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and other Palestinian political organizations, Palestinians 
across the Arab world gained the means to fight for their right to nation and homeland. In 
Lebanon, the increasing power of the PLO and the emergence of militant Palestinian guerilla 
organizations had a divisive effect on an already fragmented society. Their devotion to their 
cause and their refusal to accept permanent refugee status ignited similarly radical sentiments in 
some sectors of Lebanese society, and fearful opposition to such sentiments in others. 
 The presence of the PLO and other militant Palestinian organizations in Lebanon 
beginning in the 1960s affected religious and political groups in different ways. For the Maronite 
Christians, these organizations and their increasing guerilla activity against the state of Israel 
posed a threat to the delicate political and social system that allowed for their privileged status 
and authority. Other groups, such as the political left and the Shiites, viewed Maronite hegemony 
in Lebanon as a significant and lasting effect of the French colonial period. They related easily to 
the goals of Palestinian nationalism because they too felt disadvantaged and under-represented in 
their own society. Palestinians’ revolutionary dedication to their cause prompted leftist political 
parties to fight all the more zealously to achieve their own political objectives. The left also saw 
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the increasing political and military power of Palestinian organizations in Lebanon as a way to 
disrupt a system of government that had its foundations in the system established during the 
French mandate period. The Shiites were by far the most sympathetic to the Palestinian plight. 
Not only did they share close ties with Palestinians during the pre-mandate period, but in the 
years following their exodus from Palestine, the majority of Palestinian refugees settled in Shiite-
dominated south Lebanon. The Shiites lived in close proximity to the Palestinians, developing 
compassion for them and empathizing with their poverty and lack of status in Lebanese society.  
In the 1960s and 70s, when Israeli clashes with Palestinian guerillas in the south increased in 
frequency, Shiite and Palestinian communities alike were disrupted by the violence. 
Additionally, as Shiites in Lebanon became increasingly politically inclined beginning in the 
1960s, they too supported the PLO and the Palestinian guerilla organizations in the hopes that 
their increasing military activity in and from Lebanon would destabilize its fragile political 
system and allow for political and social change.  
 The politicization of the Palestinian refugee population and the rising political and 
military power of the PLO and Palestinian guerilla organizations in Lebanon in the 1960s and 
70s increased tensions in a religiously and politically divided society. The political and military 
activity of the guerilla organizations prompted certain sectors of Lebanese society to work harder 
towards the eradication of lasting imperialist structures in their own society, while others fought 
to minimize Palestinian influence in Lebanon and maintain the existing system of government. 
The result was a conflict, the intensity of which had not before been reached by internal political 
strife and sectarian divisions alone. The Lebanese Civil War, which began on April 13, 1975, 
lasted for fifteen years and resulted in hundreds of thousands of fatalities. Hundreds of thousands 
more were internally displaced in Lebanon or fled the country altogether. The effects of the war 
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can still be seen in Lebanese society today, more than twenty years later. The country still has 
not completely recovered from the immense violence and destruction that it witnessed between 
1975 and 1990. The essential role of the PLO and the Palestinian guerilla organizations in the 
outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War has demonstrated the far-reaching consequences, not only of 
imperialism in Palestine and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, but of imperialism 
and the need for adequate political representation for all religious and political groups throughout 
the Arab world.  
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Sectarianism and the Internal Politics of Lebanon 
 Lebanon, like many areas of the Middle East, has always been a place of great diversity, 
particularly religious diversity. Perhaps because of this religious diversity it has also been 
characterized as a deeply divided society. Yet, for much of Lebanon’s history, both before its 
independence and after, different religious communities were able to live alongside one another 
in relative peace. Over time, Lebanon became a complicated mosaic of religious communities. 
Interactions between religious sects evolved throughout the years to reflect outside influence and 
the changing politics of the region. However, before 1975, when clashes took place between 
religious sects, they were contained and were most often produced by the manipulation of 
foreign powers. This is evidenced by the fact that smaller conflicts did occur – under the 
Ottoman Empire, the French mandate, and after independence in 1943 – but never escalated to 
the point of full-scale war until 1975. Sectarianism created the climate that made such a war 
possible, but alone did not instigate it.  Thus, sectarianism was necessary but not sufficient to 
cause the outbreak civil war in 1975.  
The significance of religious affiliation and distinct religious communities in Lebanese 
society dates back to the Ottoman period under the millet system, where communities within 
Lebanon were organized by religion and were permitted to govern themselves. Because 
Lebanese society was divided into confessional communities, religious communitarian 
identification became increasingly important (Picard 10). As Petran explains,  
In the Ottoman Empire these communities became “states within a state.” Each 
community (known as a millet) was self-contained, with its own schools, personal status 
laws, courts, taxes, levies, and so on; the patriarch of each community collected the only 
tax owed the central government, the capitation tax. Ruling without interference from 
Ottoman authorities, patriarchs acquired over their co-religionists absolute social and 
political power (14).  
7 
 
Under such a system, religious communities were separate from one another and had little need 
to interact, and the communities within Lebanon were able, for the most part, to coexist. This 
began to change, however, as early as the end of the eighteenth century, when European powers 
began to use the idea of protection of non-Muslim communities as a basis for colonial 
penetration (Petran 14). France “protected” the Maronites, Austria the Greek Catholics, Russia 
the Greek Orthodox Christians, and England the Jews and the Druze. The bonds between the 
European powers and the sectarian leaders disrupted the coexistence of these minority 
communities with one another, with the Sunni Muslim majority, and with the Ottoman 
authorities (Petran 14).  
 The tension that the colonial protectorates caused between different religious minority 
groups was intensified on Mount Lebanon between the two most prominent sects – the Maronites 
and the Druze – when in 1843, the Ottomans divided the area into two districts, appointing a 
Maronite leader of one district and a Druze leader of the other (Vocke 9). In 1860, Maronite 
peasants rebelled against their Druze leader, inciting a conflict that resulted in the massacre of 
Maronite Christians on Mount Lebanon by the Druze (Petran 15). Subsequently, France, as 
protector of the Maronites, intervened, pursuing Druze forces into the Bekaa valley (Vocke 10). 
At that point, Mount Lebanon’s transformation into a “Christian entity” under European 
protection began. A colonial cooperative called the Special Regime was imposed upon Mount 
Lebanon in order to protect the Maronites from the Druze and the Ottoman officials (Petran 26). 
The Maronites on Mount Lebanon experienced certain privileges, such as exemption from 
military service, and were incorporated into the world capitalist market via the French. In 
addition, the Special Regime abolished the power of the ruling Druze feudal families, 
establishing an administrative council dominated by Maronites (Petran 26-27). The other 
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religious groups on Mount Lebanon – the Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and the 
Shiites – were underrepresented on this council, solidifying Maronite authority over the region. 
 Although the Ottoman millet system separated communities by religion and placed 
religion at the center of government, politics and society, the sects within Lebanon coexisted 
relatively peacefully for much of the later part of the Ottoman rule. It was only when European 
powers began to interfere in the region that conflict arose between the differing religious 
communities. Even then, clashes never escalated beyond that of the conflict in 1860, which, 
although bloody, was resolved relatively quickly, lasting less than a year. By the end of the 
Ottoman period, the Maronites, with the help of the French, had become the dominant sect on 
Mount Lebanon. This Maronite dominance provided the basis for further preferential treatment 
under the French mandate, helping to lay the foundation for future sectarianism in Lebanon. 
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918 after approximately four hundred years of 
rule, the French established a mandate over Greater Lebanon, which was demarcated for the first 
time and included Mount Lebanon, as well as land that had previously been considered part of 
Syria. During the rule of the French mandate, the religious leader of each sect became the official 
spokesman and governmental representative of the community. In addition, public posts and 
seats in the parliament of this new Lebanese republic were allotted on a sectarian basis, 
solidifying the system of sectarianism in government (Petran 30). Although each religious group 
had a representative in the government, it was clear during this period that the Maronites 
continued to receive the same preferential treatment that had been established under the Special 
Regime. The French were, in essence, using the Maronite community to assert their control, as 
the Maronites had always been closely linked to France and were most likely to act in France’s 
best interest (Petran 16).  In addition, a rivalry emerged between the Maronites and the Sunni 
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Muslims – two groups who had had little interaction before the creation of the state of Lebanon 
under the mandate (el-Khazen 37). The Maronites were the favored religious group and the 
majority on Mount Lebanon, but the Sunnis were the majority in Greater Syria, and were a 
significant religious group in Lebanon as well. Relations between the two groups were put to the 
test, and as el-Khazen says,  
This was an unprecedented development and an equally unprecedented experiment at 
communal and political coexistence. For the two groups had not only divergent political 
outlooks, but also a radically different historical development both as rulers and ruled 
(37). 
This rivalry between the Maronites and the Sunnis would appear again during the development 
of certain political parties in the years following Lebanese independence. When the French 
mandate came to an end in 1943, its governmental structures persisted, becoming the basis for 
the Lebanese system of government that lasted until the civil war.  
 Following Lebanese independence in 1943, an unwritten agreement was brokered 
between Maronite President Bishara al-Khouri and his Sunni Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh, 
which would determine the political structure of Lebanon until the outbreak of the civil war in 
1975.  This agreement, called the National Pact, mandated that the president of Lebanon be 
Maronite, the prime minister be Sunni, the president of the National Assembly be Shiite, the 
deputy speaker of Parliament and the deputy prime minister be Greek Orthodox, the chief of staff 
be Druze, and that the ratio of Christians to Muslims in Parliament be 6:5. The allocation of 
these government positions was based on the population percentages calculated in the 1932 
census (Ziser 58). In addition, the National Pact set out to establish Lebanon as a sovereign Arab 
nation. Al-Khouri, a Maronite with Western ties, and al-Sulh, a Sunni and known Arab 
nationalist, attempted to make compromises on behalf of their respective sects, which were, at 
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the time, the largest and most powerful religious groups. These compromises allowed for 
Lebanon to maintain ties with the West, but would not permit it to be used as a tool for further 
Western permeation and manipulation of the Middle East (Ziser 59). In addition, Lebanon was to 
remain independent from but cooperate with the rest of the Arab world. This meant that the 
Maronite population was not to seek Western intervention in Lebanese affairs, and Arab 
nationalists like al-Sulh, many of whom were Sunnis, were not to attempt to unite Lebanon with 
Syria or the rest of the Arab world. The intent of the National Pact was to unite the various 
religious sects in Lebanon, but at the same time recognize them as distinct. It created a unique 
Lebanese identity and attempted to establish a kind of communal balance. As Ziser says,  
It combined political traditions which had prevailed in Mt. Lebanon and, more generally 
speaking, in the Ottoman Empire as a whole with characteristics of the modern, 
independent state – first and foremost the parliamentary system (58). 
In this way, the National Pact seemed to be an ideal combination of the traditions of the past and 
the objectives of modern democracy, as well as a compromise between the political aspirations 
of the most prominent religious sects.   
 In the early years of the new independent Lebanese state, the complexity of Lebanese 
society became apparent in the growth of the major political parties, some of which developed 
along sectarian lines, but many of which represented the interests of multiple religious factions 
and developed out of secular ideals. The development of these political parties created the 
polarization of Lebanese society into two camps – the rightist and the leftist camps (Haley and 
Snider 4). The right was dominated by the Maronites, the major party being al-Kata’ib, led by 
Pierre Gemayel, and later the Free Nationalists or the National Liberal Party led by Camille 
Chamoun and established in 1958. The left encompassed many religious groups, notably the 
Druze, the Sunnis, and the Greek Orthodox Christians, and parties on this end of the political 
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spectrum tended to assert secular agendas. The major leftist parties were the Progressive 
Socialist Party, headed by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 
founded and led by Antun Saadeh, a Greek Orthodox Christian, the Lebanese Communist Party, 
largely supported by the Greek Orthodox community, and the Arab Nationalist Movement, 
which was mainly comprised of Sunni Muslims (Haley and Snider 4). Although the rightist camp 
was dominated by Maronite Christians and the left by Druze, Sunnis and Greek Orthodox 
Christians, political divide represented more than religion. Many Muslim leaders and even some 
Arab nationalist parties supported the right at certain times, while a significant number of 
Lebanese Christians from a variety of sects supported the left (Haley and Snider 5). So while 
sectarianism did play a role in the development of these political parties, religion was not 
necessarily the dividing factor. Instead, the right came to represent those who sought to maintain 
the status quo, mostly the Maronite Christians who had acquired an elevated political and 
economic status, and the left came to represent those who sought to change the existing order 
(Haley and Snider 5).  
 The major political parties of the rightist camp – al-Kata’ib and the National Liberal 
Party – were established by Maronite leaders with Lebanese, and in particular Christian 
Lebanese, national sentiments, who sought to protect the status of Maronites in Lebanon. The 
Kata’ib party was founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, who had participated in the 1936 
Olympics in Berlin and had been impressed by the Hitler Youth and other paramilitary 
organizations in Europe which emphasized devotion to “God, Fatherland, and Family” (Petran 
42). He returned to Lebanon and established al-Kata’ib in order to promote Lebanese 
nationalism. Al-Kata’ib claimed to be nonsectarian, however, its members and its officials were 
overwhelmingly Maronite Catholic and its political positions were the same as those advocated 
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by the Maronite community. “The Kataeb’s driving force has come from its promise to maintain 
this relatively privileged status, which was translated in the Kataeb lexicon into an inherent right 
integral to Christian security,” (Petran 43). The National Liberal Party, founded by Camille 
Chamoun at the end of his presidency, came to represent Lebanese nationalist and Maronite 
agendas similar to those of al-Kata’ib (Haley and Snider 33). The Maronites, although a large 
group in Lebanon, represented a minority in Greater Syria, which was dominated by Sunni 
Muslims (Abul-Husn 57). For this reason, assertion of Lebanese nationalism and the importance 
of maintaining the status quo that allowed for Maronite authority in Lebanon became one of the 
most important agendas of the rightist parties. As Charles Malik says,  
The Christians of Lebanon cherish their freedom; they cherish their own mastery over 
themselves and over their destiny…In the rule of numbers they will soon be in the 
minority and that is what instills fears in their hearts (cited in Haley and Snyder 6). 
For this reason the rightist political parties sought to maintain the political and governmental 
structures that would ensure Maronite power and security in Lebanon. 
 Unlike the rightist parties, dominated by the Maronite Christians, the major political 
parties of the left represented more of a variety of religious and sectarian groups. One of the first 
major leftist parties, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, emerged in 1932, before Lebanese 
independence. The SSNP was founded by Antun Saadeh, a Greek Orthodox Christian who 
advocated for Syrian nationalism and the incorporation of Lebanon into Greater Syria (Petran 
41). In addition, the party emphasized secularism and represented the interests of the middle and 
lower classes of rural Lebanon. Petran speaks of the party’s political agenda, saying, 
This mission, especially its emphasis on secularism, articulated the orientation of a 
community – the Greek Orthodox – based in the context of geographic Syria and hence 
destined to permanent coexistence with a Muslim majority. Its anti-feudalist program 
accorded with the needs and hopes of rural middle and lower-middle strata that came to 
make up the bulk of Saadeh’s following (41).  
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In this way the party attracted a following that was religiously diverse, comprised mostly of 
Greek Orthodox and Sunnis, all of whom advocated for Syrian nationalism.  
 The next major leftist political party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, emerged after the 
end of World War II and in response to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This group, 
comprised mostly of Lebanese Muslims, the majority of whom were Sunni, and some Christians, 
emphasized pan-Arab ideals and the prospect of a unified Arab nation. Later with the rise of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Arab Nationalist Movement allied with the Nasserites (Petran 46). 
Around the same time was the establishment of the Lebanese Communist Party (CPL), which 
drew most of its support from the Greek Orthodox community. The CPL focused on social 
problems within Lebanon and advocated for political reform and social awareness (Petran 46). 
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) emerged at this time also, founded by Druze leader Kamal 
Jumblat. The PSP and Jumblat put forth an agenda of progressivism and socialism as a means of 
social reform and in an effort to guarantee basic rights for the citizens of Lebanon (Petran 47). 
He was not opposed to the idea of Arab nationalism, but he saw Lebanese unity as a more 
important objective. Although the PSP was a product of the Druze community, it also attracted 
followers from other religious groups (Petran 48). What all of these leftist political groups had in 
common was the goal of social and political reform in Lebanon, as they were unhappy with the 
established political and governmental system and its ramifications in Lebanese society.  
 In the 1950s, the polarization of Lebanese society into the rightist and leftist camps was 
intensified by changing political regimes in neighboring Arab countries. With the rise of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser in Egypt and of Ba’athism in Syria and Iraq, Arab nationalism and pan-Arab 
movements were gaining strength throughout the Arab world. In the 1950s, many of the political 
parties on the left, some of which had previously advocated for Arab nationalism, began to 
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support Nasser and his pan-Arab agenda. Meanwhile, the Maronite-dominated parties on the 
right vehemently resisted the movement, fighting to maintain the current political structure in 
Lebanon (el-Khazen 105). In addition, the Suez War of 1956 caused a political split in Lebanon 
into pro-Western and anti-Western camps, the former mainly supported by the right and the later 
by the left (Petran 48). President Camille Chamoun, a right-wing Maronite, refused to break ties 
with the Western powers that had attacked Egypt during the war, angering Nasser and his 
supporters in Lebanon. Chamoun angered many Lebanese leftists further when it seemed as 
though he might join the Baghdad Pact, the agreement between pro-Western, anti-Soviet Middle 
Eastern regimes that was in opposition to the aspirations of pan-Arabism in Syria and Egypt (el-
Khazen 104). 
 The tension between the largely pro-Nasser left and the supporters of Chamoun on the 
right came to a head in 1958, during what was later referred to as the 1958 crisis. In February of 
1958, Syria and Egypt united under the rule of Gamal Abdel-Nasser to form the United Arab 
Republic, which was seen as an important step towards the formation of an Arab nation. The 
creation of the United Arab Republic “produced a heady climate of ascendant Arab nationalism 
among many Lebanese who were deeply offended by Chamoun’s now open anti-Nasserism,” 
(Petran 50). Meanwhile, President Chamoun’s lack of support for Egypt during the Suez crisis 
and his acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine were seen by many on the left as violating the 
neutral foreign policy agreed upon in the National Pact (Petran 50). In July of 1958, a rebellion 
against President Chamoun was staged. The rebels were comprised mainly of peasants, villagers, 
lower-middle class workers, progressives, and intellectuals (Petran 50). In light of the revolt, 
President Chamoun solicited the help of Maronite Christian militias, most notably the Kata’ib. 
The participation of these militias “gave the conflict a sectarian coloring, enhanced by Chamoun 
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himself, who realized he faced strong opposition and sought to incite Maronite fears that 
Christian Lebanon’s independence was at state,” (Petran 51). In addition, Chamoun appealed to 
the United Nations Security Council for assistance, and the United States, under President 
Eisenhower, intervened to intimidate and quell the opposition. The United States withdrew soon 
after the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon had been secured (Salibi 2).  
 The polarization of Lebanese society into rightist and leftist camps in the years following 
independence and during the changing regimes of the 1950s combined an element of 
sectarianism with diverging political ideologies to create a divide within Lebanese society. Yet 
the resulting conflict, the 1958 crisis, proved to be a well-contained struggle which was almost 
immediately quelled. In addition, the crisis was largely the result of the manipulation and 
influence of outside powers, with Egypt and Syria under the rule of Nasser affecting the political 
left, and the agenda of the Western powers affecting the right. Once again sectarian and political 
conflict was resolved before it had a chance to escalate to the point of civil war. 
 During the post-independence period of political polarization in Lebanon, the Shiites, 
members of one of the country’s most important religious communities, were virtually absent 
from the political arena. This began to change in the 1960s, however, due to the presence of 
Palestinian refugees in the Shiite-dominated south, and the subsequent politicization of the Shiite 
community. The Shiites in Lebanon have always been a marginalized and often persecuted 
religious group. Under the Ottoman Empire they were not recognized by the Sunni rulers as a 
distinct religious sect, unlike the Christians or the Druze. They were therefore unable to govern 
themselves as a separate community under the millet system. During the French mandate, they 
continued to be neglected. As Abul-Husn says,  
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They were marginalized by their lifestyle and political culture, as well as by the neglect 
of the central government. They were basically a peasant society characterized by little 
social mobility…the Shiites were poor, exploited rural peasants; they were 
underrepresented politically and were the least-educated group in Lebanese society (37).  
After Lebanese independence in 1943 and the establishment of the National Pact, the Shiites 
were finally incorporated into the system of government, yet they maintained their own separate 
culture and communalism. “Memories of persecution and suffering would not be abandoned in 
favor of the new national status, which offered little in the way of real material improvement,” 
(Abul-Husn 38). They continued to live in poverty and without adequate education, as they did 
not possess the kinds of educational and social institutions that other religious communities had 
(el-Khazen 42). In addition, the Shiites remained politically isolated from the rest of Lebanese 
society, failing to identify with the Arab nationalist sentiments of the Sunnis and the Druze in the 
1950s and 60s, and unable to relate to the concerns of the prosperous, elitist Maronite population.  
 The Shiite community in Lebanon was further influenced by the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, which created an influx of Palestinian refugees, many of whom settled in Shiite-
dominated southern Lebanon. With the arrival of Palestinian refugees in the south, came Israeli 
incursions and violations of Lebanese territory aimed at the Palestinians. These incursions 
resulted in Shiite causalities and damage to Shiite communities, and in turn threatened their 
traditional lifestyles, prompting many to move to Beirut. Subsequently,  
Three particular areas near Beirut quickly became transformed into vast Shiite-dominated 
suburb-slums. These areas of the city became the spawning grounds for activist political 
movements: first, the Communists and the Baathists, and later the Hezbollah and the 
Amal Movement (Abul-Husn 38).  
The movement of many Shiites to the outskirts of Beirut incited the emergence of political 
mobilization and activism within the Shiite community. It was in the 1960s that this Shiite 
political mobilization began to materialize with force. 
17 
 
 The political development that followed the migration of many Shiites to the suburbs of 
Beirut began in the 1960s with the social transformation of the Shiite community. At this time 
Shiite emigrant wealth began to have more of a visible impact on the community, educational 
levels were rising, and there was increased social mobility among the Shiite population (el-
Khazen 42). In addition, political transformation began to occur as the traditional Shiite 
leadership became increasingly isolated from the rest of the community and failed to accurately 
represent the interests of the masses. In 1967 the Muslim Shia Higher Council was established to 
counter the feeling of Sunni dominance and hegemony over Shiite affairs which had been 
prevalent since the Ottoman period (el-Khazen 43). In this way the Shiite community finally 
gained a sense of influence and autonomy which other religious groups, primarily the Maronites, 
Sunnis and Druze, had enjoyed long before.  
The most important source of political change, however, was the rise of a new Shiite 
leadership, beginning in the 1960s, with the influential Imam Musa al-Sadr at the forefront. Sadr 
worked to mobilize the Shiite community, to allow them to voice their concerns and change the 
status quo within an unequal and skewed political system (Abul-Husn 38). El-Khazen discusses 
his political influence, saying,  
Sadr captured the social and political realities of his community and brandished a new 
and powerful political weapon: that of the deprived, al-mahrumin. The symbolism of al-
mahrumin was an unprecedented ‘unifying factor’ for ‘all the Shia’, drawn from all social 
backgrounds…Empowered by the demographic expansion of the community and by 
regional disparities between the areas of the centre and those of the periphery, the issue of 
the deprived came to constitute the political platform of Shia communal politics in the 
1970s (43).  
In essence, Sadr used the disadvantaged political and socioeconomic position of the Shiite 
community to incite political movement and change. His influence altered the political landscape 
of Lebanon and laid the groundwork for the establishment of future Shiite political movements 
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such as Amal and Hezbollah in the 1970s and 80s. The increasing influence of figures such as 
Sadr and the political mobilization of the Shiite community created a highly destabilizing effect 
which further complicated the sectarian and political climates in Lebanon.  
 The sectarianism and the diverging political ideologies that developed in Lebanon from 
the Ottoman era to the post-independence period created an immensely complicated social and 
political environment in Lebanon in the years preceding the civil war. Yet it is important to note 
that alone, these factors would not have caused the outbreak of the war. This notion is supported 
by the fact that prior to 1975, clashes had occurred as a result of religious sectarian strife and 
conflicting political beliefs, but had never resulted in the enduring destruction and devastating 
violence of civil war. Sectarianism and the complicated political environment that it helped 
produce were necessary in creating the social and political climate that made the war in 1975 
possible, however these elements in themselves were not sufficient to cause such a conflict. 
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The Development of Palestinian Militancy in Lebanon and its Effects on 
Lebanese Society 
The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent war between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors has drastically affected the politics of the region in more ways than one. 
Probably the most important consequence of the creation of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War 
was the displacement of native Palestinians who either left as a result of the war or were forced 
from their land. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees fled from their homes and settled 
in neighboring Arab countries, namely Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The presence and endurance 
of the Palestinians in Lebanon has been a particularly controversial issue since their resettlement, 
primarily in southern Lebanon, beginning in 1948. Refugee presence altered the country’s 
already fragile social and political dynamics. This was further exacerbated by the events of the 
mid to late 1960s and early 1970s, with the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization in 1964 and its rise to power in Lebanon in the years leading up to the civil war in 
1975. The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 was the result of a combination of factors 
including sectarianism, political dynamics and divide, and outside influences, particularly the 
influence of the Palestinians. However, the growing military power of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon beginning in the late 1960s, and the emergence of Palestinian autonomy and military 
capability within the state of Lebanon following the Cairo Agreement in 1969 were the catalysts 
that set the war in motion. 
During the Nakba, or “catastrophe” in which 780,000 Palestinians were forced or fled 
from the new state of Israel, approximately 200,000 refugees relocated to Lebanon (Abul-Husn 
43). Throughout the mandate period, despite the demarcation of borders separating them from 
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one another for the first time, southern Lebanon and northern Palestine had maintained intimate 
social and economic relations. In the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel, because of 
these social and economic ties, most Palestinians of the northern Galilee region decided to 
resettle in southern Lebanon following their 1948 exodus. Also for this reason, the people of 
southern Lebanon were deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians and many made an effort to aid 
and shelter refugees (Siklawi 598). During their initial resettlement, the majority of the 1948 
refugees were placed in refugee camps in the south that had been established in 1935 under the 
French mandate to accommodate Turkish and Armenian refugees. These camps were meant to be 
temporary, but became permanent for some, while others were transferred to camps across 
Lebanon beginning in 1950 and under the administration of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) (Haley and Snider 24-25). The large Palestinian refugee presence in Shiite-
dominated southern Lebanon and the tendency of the Shiite population to identify with the 
refugees would significantly affect Shiite politics in Lebanon and the political mobilization of 
the Shiite community in later years. 
When Palestinians arrived in Lebanon, the Lebanese government classified them by sect 
and class. Christian Palestinians gained Lebanese citizenship easily. During the presidency of 
Camille Chamoun in the 1950s, backed by other Maronite leaders, the majority of Christian 
Palestinians achieved naturalization (Siklawi 599). Middle class Muslims could also obtain 
Lebanese citizenship relatively easily if they had last names with Lebanese roots, or through the 
act of hiring and paying a lawyer. In general, middle class Palestinians were able to settle in 
Lebanon freely, and could obtain employment and civil rights much more easily than the 
majority of Palestinians who were members of the lower classes (Siklawi 599). Palestinians of 
the lower classes were unable to obtain Lebanese citizenship. Abul-Husn describes the failure of 
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the Lebanese and other Arab governments to grant citizenship to the majority of Palestinians, 
saying, “The Arab host countries denied the Palestinians legal assimilation on the grounds that 
permanent integration in the receiving states would compromise the ultimate aim of return to 
their homeland,” (Abul-Husn 43). In addition, “Local laws give Lebanon’s Palestinians a raw 
deal, reflecting fears that assimilating them could upset Lebanon’s own delicate sectarian 
balance, since they are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim,” (“A History of the Hapless: Palestinians 
in Lebanon”). Accepting such a large group of Sunni refugees would have upset the fragile 
political and sectarian balance, threatening Maronite power and hegemony in Lebanon.  
Denied citizenship, many Palestinians refugees lived on the land granted to them by the 
Lebanese government. This land, located not only in the rural south but also near major 
Lebanese cities such as Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre, in the agricultural and industrial areas, 
became the basis of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.  Most of the refugees living in the 
camps worked the land, providing cheap agricultural labor to local factories and industrial areas 
(Siklawi 599). Palestinian refugees living in the camps in Lebanon lived in harsh conditions with 
little to no civil rights. 
They have no right to own property and no right to state schooling or medical care. They 
are banned from white-collar professions, and even from many unskilled jobs. A 
Palestinian may own a taxi, for example, but cannot legally drive it (“A History of the 
Hapless: Palestinians in Lebanon”).  
Palestinian refugees living in the camps were essentially confined to menial jobs where they 
were exploited and received less than minimum wage. They were physically and socially 
excluded from the rest of Lebanese society, and as a result, began to develop their own social 
and cultural, and, beginning in the early 1960s, political institutions (Abul-Husn 43). The 
poverty that most of these refugees faced, coupled with their separation from the rest of 
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Lebanese society, provided the fodder for the future political mobilization and activism that 
emerged from the refugee camps. 
During their initial resettlement in Lebanon, most Palestinians tried to stay out of 
Lebanese politics, focusing primarily on their own political and social issues. Yet their 
experience as refugees in Lebanon in the years following the Nakba had a significant impact on 
their social and political life, and with the establishment of the PLO in 1964, their self-awareness 
and political activism began to develop (Siklawi 600). In the early 1960s, a group of Palestinian 
activists began to emerge across the Arab world. These included Yasir Arafat, Salah Khalaf, 
Khalil al-Wazir, Faruq al-Qaddumi, Khalid al-Hassan, and other members of the emerging 
organization Fateh, which came to represent Palestinian objectives in the Arab world and became 
one of the most influential Palestinian organizations (el-Khazen 134).  The Lebanese branch of 
Fateh, called Filastinuna, had its base in Beirut. The goal of this organization was to take back 
Palestine by means of an armed struggle (el-Khazen 134). Yet, despite the emergence of Fateh, 
and other Palestinian organizations, many Palestinians looked to outside leaders, namely Gamal 
Abd al-Nasser of Egypt, to champion their cause. The rise of Nasser and his ideas of Arab 
nationalism gave them hope for an Arab nation and the recovery of Palestine, and impacted their 
increasing political activity. Petran describes this, saying, 
Initially paralyzed by the trauma of their uprooting, the refugees were electrified in turn 
by Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, the 1957 U.S.-dictated Israeli withdrawal 
from Sinai, and the 1958 Egyptian-Syrian union. Many placed their hopes for recovery of 
Palestine on Nasser’s Arab nationalism (Petran 76-77). 
Many Palestinians believed that if Nasser succeeded in uniting the Arab world, Palestine would 
be regained by the Arabs and their national home would be restored. Yet in 1961 with the 
disintegration of the United Arab Republic, Palestinians lost hope in Nasser and his ability to 
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recover their homeland. It was at this time that Palestinians and Arab nationalists began to realize 
that a unified Arab nation was not easily achievable (el-Khazen 134). For Palestinians, this 
realization meant that they also could not rely on outside assistance from other Arab countries if 
they were ever to reclaim Palestine. Thus Palestinian political movements began to gain strength 
and numbers across the Arab world. 
At the first Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in January 1964 the Arab governments, 
Lebanon included, “formally recognized the Palestinians’ right to organize and fight to liberate 
their land” (Petran 77). They authorized the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
and the Palestinian Liberation Army. However, although the Lebanese government 
representatives consented to the establishment of the PLO and the PLA, they insisted that the 
PLA have no bases or training camps in Lebanon. In addition, any Palestinian living in Lebanon 
who decided to become a member of the PLA would not be allowed to return to Lebanon (Petran 
78). The participating Arab countries agreed upon Lebanon’s conditions because of Lebanon’s 
delicate political structure (el-Khazen 136). Although prohibited from doing so, Fateh began 
organizing and establishing secret cells in Lebanon in 1965, as it did in all Arab countries with 
large Palestinian refugee populations. On January 1, 1965, al-Fatah (the Palestine National 
Liberation Movement) made its first raid into Israel. “For Palestinians in Lebanese camps this 
date became the day ‘the revolution issued’… al-Fatah appeared to offer Palestinians a chance to 
take their future into their own hands, and so acquire a political existence,” (Petran 78). 
Palestinians across the Arab world were ignited with new hope for the recovery of Palestine, and 
saw groups like Fateh and the PLO as the means to achieve their redemption. 
At the same time as Palestinians were beginning to assert their political identity and 
agenda in the Arab world, social tension was brewing in Lebanon. In May of 1961, a report was 
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conducted called the Institut de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Developpement (IRFED), 
which found that there was a substantial disparity between the living conditions in Beirut and the 
living conditions on Mount Lebanon (Petran 79). Mount Lebanon, predominantly inhabited by 
Maronite Christians, was significantly more affluent and enjoyed significantly better living 
conditions than those residing in and around Beirut. As mentioned earlier in chapter 1, with the 
influx of Palestinian refugees to southern Lebanon and subsequent Israeli incursions, many 
Shiites were forced to flee to Beirut to avoid further casualties and damage to their communities. 
These Shiites, many of whom were humble rural farmers, settled in the impoverished outskirts of 
Beirut. Likewise, many Palestinian refugee camps were located in the outskirts of Beirut, as they 
first appeared there after 1950 and the relocation of Palestinians to rural areas just outside major 
Lebanese cities (Siklawi 599). Beirut and its surrounding territories became home to many 
underprivileged and impoverished communities like the Shiites, the Palestinians, and other 
marginalized minorities such as the Kurds, providing a stark contrast to the prosperous Mount 
Lebanon.  
With these findings came a new wave of social activism in the wake of Nasser’s attempts 
at socialist reform and the break-up of the UAR, led by the political left and in particular by 
Kamal Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party, the Communist Party of Lebanon, and the 
Arab nationalist movement (Petran 80). In turn, al-Kata’ib and its Maronite leaders attempted to 
maintain the status quo at all costs. Rather than recognizing the economic disparities between 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon and working towards socioeconomic change, al-Kata’ib and other 
rightists attempted to rid Beirut of the unsightly poverty that surrounded the city. In response to 
urban migration and the emergence of poor squatter communities on the outskirts of Beirut, al-
Kata’ib demanded that these communities be removed or destroyed. Since the Maronite Church 
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owns much of the land in and around Beirut, the Lebanese government conceded, but also 
authorized the rebuilding of these communities, ultimately pleasing neither the left nor the right 
(Petran 80). In these years leading up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, tensions between the 
political far left and the far right arose in Lebanese society once again. 
In June of 1967 conflict erupted once again between the state of Israel and its Arab 
neighbors of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Although Lebanon was not directly involved in the 
fighting, the 1967 war still had serious implications for the Lebanese. Those living in the south, 
mainly Shiites and Palestinian refugees, were particularly affected by the war, having 
experienced Israeli raids and other Israeli violations of Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Shiites 
and the Palestinian refugees seemed to share a common experience, as both groups suffered at 
the hands of the Israelis, who often destroyed their homes or kidnapped their loved ones (Petran 
89). The common suffering of these two groups would prove important in the years following the 
war, when the Palestinian question would begin to create an even bigger divide in the Lebanese 
political arena.  The most important consequence of the 1967 war, however, was the complete 
and utter defeat of the Arab countries by Israel. Additionally, the Arab governments were forced 
to surrender and to accept Israeli terms and the new Israeli borders. As Petran says, 
The failure of the Arab governments to achieve any Israeli withdrawal whatsoever by 
diplomatic means radicalized the popular classes in all eastern Arab countries. The result 
was that, on the one hand, only the Palestinian resistance was left to carry on the national 
liberation war, and on the other, the conflict became to an important degree an internal 
class conflict in each Arab country. This was especially true in Lebanon (Petran 91). 
With the defeat of Syria, Egypt and Jordan, Palestinians abandoned once and for all the ideals of 
pan-Arab politics that they had once put so much faith in. In addition, the 1967 defeat discredited 
the leadership and abilities of Ahmad Shukeiri, the first chairman of the PLO. Following the 
1967 war, Ahmad Shukeiri was forced to step down, and the PLO was taken over by Palestinian 
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guerilla organizations (el-Khazen 135). The PLO’s change in leadership had consequences for 
the Arab nations that bordered Israel and had large Palestinian refugee populations. In Lebanon, 
this new, more militant PLO leadership began to establish secret military training bases in the 
Lebanese refugee camps of Rashidiyeh, ‘Ayn al-Helweh, Tal-Za’tar and Borj al-Barajneh (el-
Khazen 136). The establishment of these training bases was in direct violation of the parameters 
set forth in the first Arab Summit Conference of 1964, and they would provide the basis for 
future Palestinian military operations and power in Lebanon. 
 The 1967 war had serious political implications for Lebanon, further polarizing an 
already divided society. The Maronite-dominated right saw, in the aftermath of the conflict, the 
opportunity to declare Lebanon as a neutral state unconnected to the rest of the Arab world, and 
to strengthen its ties with the West. The far left on the other hand, felt it important “to revise 
outdated institutions, to eliminate sectarian privileges, and to allow Lebanon to assume its 
national responsibilities in the Arab world,” (Petran 96). Beginning in 1968, support for 
Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon became increasingly public and vocal. Representatives of the far 
left saw support for the Palestinian cause in Lebanon as a means to change the status quo and 
disrupt a system of government that did not accurately represent the interests of all Lebanese 
people. Many members of the left, composed of a wide variety of religious communities, namely 
Sunnis, Greek Orthodox and Druze, therefore supported Palestinian guerilla activity out of 
Lebanon. Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party Kamal Jumblatt emerged as an 
outspoken advocate for the Palestinian cause. Prominent religious leader Mohammad ‘Ali al-
Juzu, Sunni mufti of Mount Lebanon, formed a committee to collect funds for the guerillas (el-
Khazen 137). Members of the far left were not the only supporters of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon. The Shiite community, a notoriously underprivileged and politically underrepresented 
27 
 
group, also saw Palestinian guerilla presence in Lebanon as a way to disrupt the current system 
of government and power. In addition, the majority of Shiites in Lebanon felt akin to the 
Palestinians and sympathized with their plight. In August of 1968, Ja’far al-Sadik, a Lebanese 
Shia cleric, received a fatwa, or ruling, from Najaf in Iraq authorizing the use of violence by the 
guerilla fighters against Israel (el-Khazen 137). This support by prominent Lebanese religious 
and political figures encouraged the guerillas to continue their raids against Israel from Lebanese 
territory, violating the wishes of the Lebanese government and threatening Lebanon’s current 
political and social system.  
In the summer of 1968, the number of guerillas infiltrating from Syrian territory into the 
‘Arqub region in south Lebanon was increasing. As a result, conflict began to occur between the 
guerillas and the Lebanese army, under the control of the Maronite president and often seen as a 
military tool of the right-wing government. In addition, clashes between the guerillas and Israel 
increased (el-Khazen 137). On June 14, 1968, the first significant attack on Israel by the PLO 
from Lebanese territory was launched.  In retaliation, Israel conducted its first raid into Lebanon 
on October 30, 1968, targeting a Fateh encampment (el-Khazen 137). At this point, for the 
Maronites and other members of the far right who sought to maintain the current system at all 
costs, the problem was not only to stop the PLO and their guerilla fighters, but also to stop the 
mobilization of Palestinians in refugee camps across Lebanon. The PLO had started a movement 
in Lebanon that was not likely to be reversed. 
By October 1968, confrontations between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian 
guerillas were becoming more frequent. On November 16, 1968, a meeting was held between 
representatives from the Lebanese army and representatives from the Palestinian organizations. 
The Palestinian officials asserted that their intent was to attack targets in Israel only, and that in 
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order to do so they needed to pass through Lebanon. The Lebanese army representatives 
responded by reminding the Palestinians of Lebanon’s armistice agreement with Israel, and 
prohibiting future Palestinian infiltration into Lebanon for the purpose of attacking Israel (el-
Khazen 141). From the point of view of the Lebanese army, Palestinian guerilla attacks from 
Lebanese soil were putting Lebanese civilians at risk of Israeli attacks and jeopardizing 
Lebanon’s armistice with Israel. Yet despite attempts to prevent such attacks, in December of 
1968, Israel launched a surprise attack on Beirut airport in reaction to the military operations of 
Palestinian guerillas attacking from south Lebanon (Vocke 35). The majority of Lebanon’s civil 
aviation fleet was destroyed.  
This first retaliation on Lebanese territory gave a foretaste of the problems raised by the 
new guerilla policy of the Palestinians, who were now operating from Lebanon without 
the consent or even the knowledge of the Lebanese army. Yet most of the victims of the 
first Israeli raids were Lebanese (Vocke 36).  
The actions of the PLO and the Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon had succeeded in involving the 
Lebanese government in a conflict that it had tried so desperately to stay out of. Not only this, 
but now the Palestinian issue had become one that was inextricably tied to Lebanese internal 
politics. 
The issue of Palestinian guerilla activity and Israeli retaliations in Lebanon greatly 
affected the inhabitants of south Lebanon, where the majority of the action was taking place. 
Because the inhabitants of south Lebanon were primarily Shiite, and because the Shiite 
community tended to sympathize with the Palestinians, by the end of 1968, Imam Musa al-Sadr 
emerged as a leading advocate for the Palestinian cause (Petran 98). He, like other Shiite leaders 
and prominent members of the political left, also saw support for the Palestinian guerillas as a 
way to break Maronite right-wing hegemony in Lebanon. In other parts of the country, the 
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Palestinian issue led to further conflict. On November 2, 1968, there were mass student 
demonstrations and other pro-Palestinian protests throughout Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon led by 
left-wing, mainly Sunni, Druze and Greek Orthodox demonstrators. Maronite student militias 
responded by attacking pro-Palestinian protestors, and subsequently, counter-demonstrations 
were led by Kata’ib and other rightist students. The death of a student in Tripoli led to a 
government ban on demonstrations and a cabinet debate on calling in the army. Yet while the 
government decided against military force, the private militias of al-Kata’ib and Camille 
Chamoun’s Ahrar were undergoing training and receiving arms (Petran 98-99). 
Tension between the right and the Palestinians, supported by the left, came to a head in 
April of 1969. Early in the year, President Charles Helou made it clear that he saw the 
Palestinians, rather than the Israelis, as the enemy. The Internal Security Forces (ISF), the 
government police force, began arresting Palestinians and their leftist supporters in an effort to 
cut the Palestinian supply line from Syria and destroy Palestinian militancy in the south (Petran 
100). In mid-April 1969, the ISF attempted to arrest a group of commandos, returning from an 
operation in Israel, in the southern town of Bint Jbeil. The townspeople refused to hand over the 
commandos and the ISF in turn bombarded the town for three days before the commandos gave 
themselves up. On April 15, 1969, fighting broke out between the Lebanese army and infiltrating 
guerillas from Syria in the southern village of Deir Mimas. In the days following, additional 
clashes occurred between the Lebanese army and armed Palestinians in the villages of ‘Odeiseh 
and Khiyam, resulting in several Palestinian causalities (el-Khazen 142). These incidents sparked 
protests and demonstrations across Lebanon. Leftist leaders like Jumblatt and members of other 
progressive and socialist parties called for others to join the resistance movement. On April 23, 
between 10,000 and 15,000 demonstrators gathered in a Muslim quarter of Beirut to march on 
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the city center and were met with armed opposition by the ISF, who attacked them with tear-gas 
grenades and hoses of hot water (Petran 101). The unarmed protestors were then fired upon by 
the ISF and the army forces. Local strikes continued for days following the initial protest, and 
finally the government was forced to impose a state of emergency. The growing support for the 
Palestinians by the left was paving the way for the Cairo Agreement and the arming of the PLO 
in Lebanon. 
The situation in Lebanon worsened in the months following the April protests of 1969. 
The Lebanese Army and the ISF engaged in many violent clashes with al-Fatah and al-Saiqa, the 
Palestinian Baathist political and military faction, in late April and early May of that year. Both 
Syrian President Adnan Atassi and Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser were called upon 
by President Helou to mediate and curtail Palestinian military activity in Lebanon. Although 
Nasser was ultimately successful, hostilities ceased for only a short period of time (Petran 102). 
In August of 1969 Israel resumed its attacks on southern Lebanon, aiming at Palestinian 
commandos and Palestinian refugee camps. In the same month, the Lebanese army also resumed 
its attacks on Palestinian refugee camps, breaking into the Nahr al-Bared camp north of Tripoli. 
This attack, however, was unsuccessful. The refugees fought back and the Lebanese army 
retreated, and, in light of their success, Palestinians in other refugee camps went on to liberate 
themselves from army control (Siklawi 601). In October of 1969, the Palestinian guerillas took 
control of the refugee camps in Lebanon, and the Lebanese army resumed its attacks on the 
camps. Strong protests from other Arab countries, including Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and 
South Yemen, ensued (Petran 103). “Nasser indicated that the events were cause for concern for 
Arab public opinion and called upon Helou, to opt for dialogue and help end the crisis on the 
grounds that Lebanon was an integral part of the Arab nation,” (el-Khazen 159). President 
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Nasser asserted that it was his goal to reach an agreement that would be beneficial to all parties 
involved. By then, because the government was losing its control over the Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon, President Helou agreed to President Nasser’s offer for mediation. 
On November 2, 1969, the Palestinian delegation, including prominent Palestinian 
figures such as Yasser Arafat, ‘Abdul-Razzak Yahya, Yasir ‘Amru, Khalid al-Yashruti, Bilal al-
Hasan, Abu Iyad, and Abu Sabri, arrived in Cairo and the discussion between the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese government began. General Boustany of the Lebanese army was in Cairo to 
represent the interests of the Lebanese government, which were mainly to preserve the 
sovereignty of Lebanon and to maintain the delicate political balance of the Lebanese 
government (el-Khazen 158). The Egyptians, in particular Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud 
Riad, acknowledged Lebanon’s fragile political structure but also asserted that the Lebanese still 
ought to take part in the Palestinian cause. The Palestinians said that they wanted freedom of 
military and political action in Lebanon, promising not to intervene in Lebanese internal politics 
and to respect Lebanese sovereignty (el-Khazen 158). On November 3, 1969, an agreement was 
reached. Initially kept secret from the public, the terms of the agreement eventually became 
widespread news (Vocke 36). The Lebanese government agreed to allow the Palestinian guerillas 
to maintain certain fortified positions in southern Lebanon from which to attack Israel, and 
renounced their right to police Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The PLO and the various 
Palestinian guerilla organizations promised in return to keep the Lebanese army informed about 
all operations from within Lebanon and agreed not to carry arms outside the Palestinian refugee 
camps except in certain areas agreed upon by both parties (Vocke 36). The ambiguity of the 
terms outlined in the agreement and the absence of clearly defined areas from which the 
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Palestinian guerillas could operate would create future conflict between the Palestinians and 
representatives of the Lebanese government.  
In the Lebanese political arena, the Cairo Agreement received both support and 
opposition. The left, particularly Kamal Jumblatt, the Sunni political establishment, and other 
leftist party members and politicians, saw the Cairo Agreement as a victory, as did the majority 
of the Shiite community. Allowing the PLO and the Palestinian guerillas to exercise such power 
in Lebanon would disrupt Maronite and right-wing hegemony. For this reason, the right, 
particularly the Maronite community and the Kata’ib party, was outright opposed to the 
agreement. Other members of the right, although less outright in their opposition, still viewed the 
agreement with suspicion and caution (el-Khazen 164). The situation became increasingly 
politically charged in 1970, when the Palestinian guerillas began to expand their control over 
areas outside the refugee camps, seen by the right as violating the terms of the Cairo Agreement. 
Throughout the year of 1970, a variety of agreements were brokered between the Lebanese army 
and representatives from the Palestinian guerilla organizations in an effort by the Lebanese 
government to keep the Palestinians in check. Yet, as el-Khazen points out, “These measures, 
however, did not make Palestinian interpretations of the Cairo Agreement any less divergent,” 
(el-Khazen 165-166). By the middle of 1970, soon after the brokering of the agreement, it was, 
in essence, void.  
By 1970, the PLO and other Palestinian guerilla organizations continued deploying arms 
outside of the refugee camps and thus coming into conflict with the Lebanese army. In March of 
that year, a serious confrontation occurred between the Lebanese army and the guerillas, 
beginning in the Maronite town of Kahhaleh and spreading to the outskirts of Beirut (el-Khazen 
189). In the aftermath of the incident, the fighting spread to other areas of Lebanon. Because the 
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Lebanese army was, in the eyes of the Palestinians and the left, seen as a military tool for the 
Maronites and the political right, the confrontation that occurred between the army and the 
guerillas in March of 1970 led to further violence between the Palestinians and Maronite 
Christian populations in Lebanon. Fighting spread to the towns of Dikwaneh and Harit Hreik, 
both majority Maronite, and both located near Palestinian refugee camps (el-Khazen 189). 
Guerillas began to expand their military presence outside the camps and near these towns, setting 
up roadblocks and harassing passersby. In Dikwaneh, Palestinian guerillas raided a local Kata’ib 
Party office, and even went to such lengths as to kidnap the son of Maronite Kata’ib Party leader 
Pierre Gemayel (el-Khazen 189). Such confrontations between the Maronite population, 
particularly al-Kata’ib, and the Palestinian guerillas set the stage for future violence between the 
two, which would have a significant impact on the events that were considered the first triggers 
of the war in 1975 and the path that the war would take over the years. 
In September 1970, events in Jordan significantly impacted the state of turmoil that was 
brewing in Lebanon. Like Lebanon, Jordan had, since 1948, had a large population of Palestinian 
refugees. After the 1967 war and the Arab defeat by Israel, the PLO and other Palestinian 
guerilla organizations had begun to establish a sound military presence in Jordan, coming into 
conflict with King Hussein and the Jordanian government, much like they had with the Lebanese 
government. The PLO began setting up military checkpoints, carrying arms throughout the 
country, and acting in such ways that challenged the authority of the Hashemite ruling family 
and King Hussein. King Hussein did not want to lose control over the Palestinians at a time when 
he was trying to negotiate with Israel to recover the West Bank, which was lost in the 1967 war 
(Siklawi 604). Thus, the king started a military campaign against the PLO in Jordan, using his 
army to keep them in check and under his control. On September 1, 1970, the Palestinians 
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responded with several assassination attempts on the king. A few days later, on September 6, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a prominent Palestinian guerilla 
organization, hijacked Swissair, TWA, and BOAC airplanes and forced them to land in the 
Jordanian airport of Zarqa. The passengers were removed and the planes were blown up (Siklawi 
604). These acts angered King Hussein, forcing him to declare martial law in Jordan. After 
almost a year of clashes between the Jordanian army and the Palestinians, the PLO was fully 
evicted from Jordan in July of 1971 (Siklawi 604). The significance of this for the Lebanon was 
that the country became the last military base from which Palestinian guerillas could operate 
against Israel, and the Jordanian branch of the Palestinian resistance movement migrated to south 
Lebanon. 
In the aftermath of Black September, as the events in Jordan came to be called, south 
Lebanon had become “an enduring battlefield in the region,” (Siklawi 605). “The unpleasant 
events in Jordan exacerbated the situation inside Lebanon and expanded the PLO operational 
area rather than eliminating the problems between the Palestinians and the Lebanese authorities,” 
(Siklawi 605). The year 1972 was one of transition for the PLO, which had been divided and 
undermined by the events of Black September. Although the PLO was aware that the escalation 
of conflict in Lebanon would undermine their transition from Jordan to Lebanon, Palestinians did 
create minor troubles for the Lebanese government in that year (el-Khazen 194). In January of 
1972, al-Sa’iqa attacked a Beirut office of the Lebanese ISF. In addition, the PLO continued its 
guerilla operations against Israel, and Israel retaliated by carrying out raids in the south and the 
Bekaa region. Although 1972 was a year of transition and minor skirmishes between the PLO 
and the Lebanese authorities, the following year would be one of complete chaos, beginning to 
set the civil war in motion.  
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During the year of 1973, a series of attacks were carried out by Israel against Palestinians 
in Lebanon that seriously disrupted the country’s political balance. On February 21, 1973, the 
Israelis landed on the coast near Tripoli and attacked two Palestinian refugee camps, Nahr al-
Barid and Baddawi, and the Lebanese army did nothing to stop them. Thirty-one civilians were 
killed and 60 more were injured (Siklawi 605). In April of 1973, Israeli commandos targeted the 
PLO in Beirut. Forty Palestinians in refugee camps in Beirut were killed, along with four 
Lebanese civilians. This operation, called the Verdun operation, also resulted in the assassination 
of three high-ranking PLO officials. In the aftermath of such attacks, the Lebanese army was 
seen as unwilling to adequately defend the Palestinians in Lebanon (Siklawi 606). This further 
deepened the political divide between the anti-Palestinian right and the pro-Palestinian left. The 
Maronites and the right saw the Israeli attacks as a chance to revise the Cairo Agreement and 
work to expel the PLO from Lebanon as the Jordanians had. The left-wing parties and the 
Palestinians demanded the resignation of the Lebanese government and President Franjiyya, who 
had, in their eyes, allowed for the Israelis to attack innocent Palestinians on their soil (Siklawi 
606). Matters were made worse in March of 1973, when Palestinian guerillas attacked the 
Lebanese army post in the south, killing two Lebanese army soldiers. In May, three army 
soldiers were kidnapped by Palestinian guerillas (el-Khazen 206). In retaliation, the Lebanese 
army surrounded Palestinian camps on the outskirts of Beirut, arresting and detaining a number 
of Palestinians. Soon enough, fighting broke out between the army and the Palestinian guerilla 
forces. In light of such events, the Lebanese army’s attitude towards the Palestinian refugee 
camps, which they viewed as headquarters for the guerilla organizations and the PLO, became 
significantly more ruthless (Siklawi 607). The Lebanese army and air force began shelling 
Palestinian refugee camps in and around Beirut, particularly the camp of Burj al-Barajina near 
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Beirut Airport. The attack on Burj al-Barajina caused damage to the Palestinians as well as to the 
Shiite communities that lived near the camp, deepening Shiite opposition to the right-wing 
Lebanese government (Siklawi 607). Similar clashes also occurred between the Lebanese army 
and the Palestinians in the south.  
In May of 1973, an attempt at reconciliation was made once again with the Melkart 
Protocol, which was signed between Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian resistance. This 
agreement called for a return to the Cairo Agreement, and attempted to more clearly define the 
areas in which the PLO and the guerilla organizations could operate (Siklawi 608). Yet 
confrontations between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians continued. In July of 1974, al-
Kata’ib and the PFLP fought a three-day battle in east Beirut, resulting in five civilian casualties. 
In September of 1974, hostilities took place between the leftist followers of Kamal Jumblatt and 
al-Kata’ib in the village of Tarshish (el-Khazen 224). Although only a few people were killed, 
this incident represented an increase in aggression between the right-wing parties and the 
Palestinian-supporting parties on the left. Such a climate precipitated the events of April 1975 
that would set the civil war in motion.  
On April 13, 1975, the leader of the Kata’ib party, Pierre Gemayel, was attending church 
in Ain Rummaneh, a Christian suburb of Beirut. It was at this time that Palestinian guerillas 
approached the church in two cars, opening fire and killing four Christians, among them, a 
prominent member of the Kata’ib party (Vocke 39). A few hours later, in retaliation for the 
attack, Christian militias stopped a bus in Ain Rummaneh carrying twenty-two armed 
Palestinians, shooting and killing all twenty-two of them (Vocke 39). These events, considered 
the first confrontations of the Lebanese Civil War, sparked clashes across the city of Beirut. The 
conflict soon developed into a religious one, with Palestinians, backed by Shiite, Sunni and 
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Druze left wing militia fighters, attacking Maronite and other Christian sections of East Beirut, 
and the right wing Kata’ib and Maronite militias attacking targets in Palestinian and Muslim-
dominated West Beirut (Vocke 41). The war had officially begun.  
The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 was the consequence of many factors, 
both internal and external, that had been developing in Lebanon since the Ottoman Empire and 
throughout the twentieth century. Yet it was the Palestinian factor that set all others in motion, 
aggravating and intensifying deep-seated tensions between political, social and sectarian groups 
in Lebanon. The refusal of the Palestinian organizations to accept their underprivileged social 
and political position in the wake of the creation of the state of Israel ignited a similar attitude in 
disadvantaged communities within Lebanon. This was the case for the Shiites in particular, who 
sympathized with the Palestinian plight not only because they too were victimized by Israeli 
aggression, but because they also found themselves marginalized within their own country. 
Members of the political left were also unhappy with the system of government and the political 
and social structures that prevailed in Lebanon. They felt that support for the PLO and 
Palestinian guerilla organizations could effectively disrupt the current Lebanese political 
structure and allow for change and the creation of a system that better represented their 
objectives. The political right in Lebanon, led by the Maronite Christian community, saw the 
Palestinian organizations as threats to their privileged position in Lebanese government and 
society. They feared, above all else, that a change in government would eliminate their power 
and leave them marginalized in a majority-Muslim region dominated by the culture of Islam. The 
increasing military power of the PLO and the guerilla organizations, inciting support from the 
Shiites and the left, and threatening the right, thus provoked aggression on both sides. The result 
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was the complete division of a society that was already divided, and a conflict that tore Lebanon 
to pieces, preventing peace and stability to this day.  
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Conclusion 
Since 1948, Palestinians have become synonymous with refugees. They are a national 
group with no nation, a group that has been denied basic human rights within the state of Israel 
and as refugees in other parts of the world. They are often depicted as a people with little to lose, 
and as a group that has often resorted to violence as a means of asserting that they will not be 
forgotten and will not stop fighting until they reclaim what is rightfully theirs. For many in the 
Arab world they are the embodiment of the lasting negative effects of the colonial period. They 
are an ideal representation of imperial exploitation, promised self-determination and then forced 
to endure further colonization and occupation. They are a constant reminder to the rest of the 
region of the enduring colonial structures within their own countries. For the Lebanese, their 
system of government, established at the time of independence in 1943 under the authority of the 
National Pact, had its roots in the French colonial system that had been instituted during the 
mandate period. This government solidified the system of Maronite power and hegemony in 
Lebanon that had gained prominence under French imperialism. For many sectors of Lebanese 
society, this system of government failed to provide adequate political and social representation. 
Although many groups, particularly the political left, had worked to change this system of 
government and power, it was the nationalist activism of the Palestinians in Lebanon in the 
1960s and 70s that sparked more aggressive attempts to alter the status quo. The increasing 
military activity of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations during this period sparked strong 
responses from many political parties and religious groups on both ends of the political 
spectrum, deepening the divide in an already polarized society, and leading to the outbreak of 
civil war.  
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 For hundreds of years, Lebanon has been home to many different religious communities. 
Under the Ottoman millet system, because individual religious communities were permitted to 
govern themselves, these communities rarely came into contact with one another. Following 
Ottoman rule, under the French colonial system, religious communities that had seldom 
interacted before were forced to cooperate under a new system of government that allocated 
positions based on sect. Although most religious groups had power and representation in 
Lebanese government under this new system, the Maronite community was by far the most 
powerful and enjoyed an elevated status in politics and society. Even after Lebanese 
independence in 1943, this system of government, and Maronite hegemony, prevailed. Thus, in 
the decades following independence, the political polarization of Lebanese society occurred, 
with Maronites on the far right, seeking to maintain the political and social system that would 
preserve their authority, and the far left, a significantly more diverse group, seeking to incite 
political and social change. This division in Lebanese society was exacerbated by the political 
and military action of the PLO and Palestinian guerilla organizations in Lebanon in the following 
decades.  
 The activities of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations in Lebanon in the 1960s and 
70s had a pervasive effect on a fragmented society. For the Maronites, the Palestinian 
organizations posed the greatest threat to their prominent political and social position. As a 
minority within Lebanon and the greater Arab world, the Maronites feared that without supreme 
political power they would face marginalization in this majority-Muslim society. For many 
disadvantaged groups, such as the Shiites, and the leftist political parties, composed primarily of 
Sunnis, Druze and Greek Orthodox Christians, the political and military activity of the 
Palestinian organizations represented an attempt to eradicate lasting imperialist structures 
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throughout the region. Their nationalist activism inspired these sectors of Lebanese society to 
analyze and work to eliminate enduring colonial systems in their own society, particularly, the 
system of government that allowed for Maronite authority. Additionally, the political left and the 
Shiites saw their support for the PLO and Palestinian guerilla organizations as a way to disrupt 
the fragile system of government in Lebanon, and thus provide a means for reform. For many 
Shiites, their communal ties and close proximity to the Palestinians in south Lebanon provoked 
empathy for their plight, providing another incentive for Shiite support of Palestinian militancy 
in Lebanon. The result of these conflicting goals was the deepening of political, social and 
religious tensions, and ultimately the outbreak of one of the most violent civil wars the Arab 
world has ever seen.  
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most controversial and debated conflicts in 
our world today. It began as a consequence of Western imperialism in the Arab world and the 
creation of a state in Palestine without regard for the native Palestinian population. Often, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only discussed in the context of its effect on Israelis and 
Palestinians, when in reality it has had significant and lasting effects on the entire region.  The 
displacement of Palestinians and their relocation to other countries in the Arab world has vastly 
altered the political landscape of many Arab nations, including Lebanon, and has affected every 
political, social and religious group in the region. The violence of the Lebanese Civil War only 
represents a fraction of the violence that has resulted from the never-ending hostility between 
Palestinians and Israelis. When so many lives have been lost and so much destruction has 
occurred, questions of rightful land ownership are insignificant. Regardless of what each side 
believes it deserves, a resolution to this conflict must be reached. If not, the Arab world will 
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continue to know nothing but violence and chaos, and wars will continue to be waged in the 
name of justice and retribution.  
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